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ROHE V. STATE BAR.

[17 C. (2d)

pay Miss Monti 75 per cent of the $1300, but that he would
not do so under compulsion either of the civil action brought
by her or of the State Bar proceeding.
In its recommendations the committee expressed its belief
that Miss Monti had been willing that the petitioner should
include the three obligations in the negotiations for a settlement of her claim against Mr. Fields, and that he should
have the benefit thereof without accounting to her, if they
could be settled for a small amount;· but that the dispute
arose over the fact that the petitioner did not fully or fairly
advise her of all steps taken in connection with the settlement of his obligations and that had Miss Monti known that
as a result of those negotiations he had received more than
double the original fee agreed upon, she would not have au·thorized the liquidation of his obligations in the manner disclosed.
These findings and conclusions, as qualified by the committee's analysis in its recommendations, are supported by
the record. This is so even though we consider favorably to
the petitioner the· collateral matters referred to by him and
relied JlPon as showing a motive to cast discredit upon him
by the initiation of proceedings before the State Bar. It is.
a fact that the events herein were not called to the atten--"
tion of· the State Bar for nearly a year after their occurrenpe.
But.it is also a fact that in the meantime Miss Monti had
brought a civil action against the petitioner. [2] Whatever
may have been the instigating factor, or whatever may have
been the personal motive, in the initiation of the State Bar
proceeding, are not matters of controlling concern in a case
where the facts disclosed independently lead to the conclu· sion that the attorney is subject to some disciplinary action.
There is ,no showing that any personal motives of individuals
\havegenerated any pressure or .prejudice or have in any way
. prevented the petitioner from having full, fair and unbiased
~earings. However, we are in agreement with the petitioner
that under all the circumstances disbarment is too harsh
.discipline, and that the ends to be subserved ·by the proceed· in:g herein will be satisfied by a suspension as recommended
· by the local committee.
.
It is ordered that the petitioner, Clifford A. Rohe, be suspended from the practice of the law in this state for a period
of three months, beginning thirty days from and after the
filing of this order•
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[erim. No. 4324. In Bank.-February 20, 1941.J

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM YOUNG, Appel.
lant.
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Competency and MaterialitY-Con_

fessions-Proof of Confession-Absence of Reporter.-A confession of an accused taken down by question and answer
by a shorthand reporter and transcribed by him may be introduced in evidence, though the reporter was not called as a
witness, where a POlice officer testified that the defendant read
the transcribed statement and freely and voluntarily signed
it in his presence.
l2] Id.-Evidence - Competency and Materiality _ Documentary
Evidence-Proof of Randwriting._The defendant's signature
to a letter is Sufficiently proved to authorize its intrOduction
in evidence where an admission of writing it was contained
in his signed confession introduced in evidence and was also
testified to by a witness, and where his signature was identified by a handwriting expert with another letter by him.
[3] Id.-Argument and Conduct of Counsel-Concluding Arguments-Scope of Argument-Comment upon Defendant.-In
a prosecution for murder, a reference· by the district attorney
in his closing argument to the defendant as a "killer" did
not constitute prejudicial misconduct in the light of evidence
establishing the crime.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239),
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County and from an order denying a new trial. Peirson M.
Hall, JUdge. Affirmed.
No appearance for Appellant.
Earl Warren, Attorney-General, .and· Eugene M. Elson,
Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.
THE COURT.~Defendant was found guilty of firsf degree murder without recommendation of leniency in the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County which pronounced
1. See 8 Cal Jur. 117; 20 Am. Jur. 452; 1 R. C. L. 576.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Criminal Law, § 475; 2. Criminal
Law, § 517 j 3. Criminal Law, § 629.
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the death sentence and denied a motion for a new trial. The
cause comes before this court on an automatic appeal.
The evidence establishes the following facts: Defendant,
twenty-six: years old and unmarried, was in love with Ruth
Lugo, a twenty-nine year old Mexican woman who had been
twice married and had four children. Her refusal to marry
him and her plea that they stop seeing each other led the
defendant to brooding which culminated in his determination
to kill her and himself. To that end he stole a gun, purchased
cartridges and wrote a letter outlining his plan to be given
to his mother. On June 10, 1940, he called on Ruth Lugo
and tried to persuade her to marry him. Failing to do so, he
came over to her chair, sat in her lap, and fired two shots
through her chest, causing her death. Members of the family, residing in the same house and in near-by houses, heard
the shots and rushed into the room where they found the
defendant with a gun in his hand near the body of Ruth
Lugo. The shot which he fired at himself just missed being
fatal. While he was attempting to shoot himself a second
time, the members of the family intervened, finally overpowered him and then delivered him into the custody of the
police.
[1] During the course of the trial Police Officer"Lopez'"
took the stand and testified that shortly after the killing
he had interviewed the defendant, that the questions and
answers were taken down by a shorthand reporter under
his direction, that these shorthand notes were transcribed by
the reporter, that he had read them shortly after they were
transcribed and verified them as correct. He was then asked
to give the questions and answers, but defendant objected
on the grounds that the shorthand reporter was not present
to verify the transcribed statement and that no proper foundation had been laid. Lopez did not give the questions and
answers but testified that the questions and answers contained in the written statement produced in court and shown
to him were correct according to his present recollection.
Officer Fremont then testified that defendant subsequently
had read the statement and freely and voluntarily signed it
in his presence. The statement contained a full confession
of the crime by the defendant, and the parts considered relevant and not prejudicial were read to the jury as evidence.
Regardless of Officer Lopez's testimony which merely identified the statements contained in the written document as
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those made to him by defendant, Officer Fremont's testimony
was sufficient to justify the reading of the relevant portions
thereof to the jury as a confession of the crime.
[2] The defendant further objected to the introduction
in evidence of the letter written by him to his mother on the
ground that there was insufficient proof that the signature
on the letter was defendant's. Defendant's admission in his
signed confession that he had written the letter, the testimony by a witness that defendant immediately after the shooting admitted writing the letter, and the testimony by a handwriting expert identifying the signature with that on another
letter written by the defendant, justify the finding of the
trial court that the signature had been sufficiently proven to
permit the introduction of the letter. (Code Civ. Proc., secs.
1940, 1944.)
[3] The district attorney's reference to the defendant as
a "killer" in his closing address to the jury did not constitute prejudicial misconduct justifying a reversal in the
light of the facts of the case.
In view of the ample evidence to support the verdict, the
absence of any errors in the record, and the soundness of the
instructions given by the trial judge to the jury, the judgment and order of the trial court are affirmed.

[Crim. No. 4327.

In Bank.-February 20, 1941.)

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, V. ARKELL H. CRAIG, Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law - Former Jeopardy - Identity of Offenses-

What Constitutes Identity of Offenses-Offenses Against Persons.-Under Pen. Code, sec. 261, only one offense of rape
results from a single act of sexual intercourse, although that
act may be accomplished under more than one of the circumstances specified in the statute; e. g., where the intercourse
is had by the use of force, upon a girl under the age of
consent.
[2] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses-Introductory_

Tests for Determining Identity.-A common test whereby for
2. See 7 Cal. Jur. 956; 15 Am. Jur. 54; 8 R. C. L. 143.
MeR. Dig. References: 1. Criminal Law, § 143; 2. Criminal
Law, § 139; 3. Criminal Law, § 1016; 4. Criminal Law, § 1446.

